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•	 Central banks play a pivotal role in well-functioning 
payments systems by providing liquidity via col-
lateralized lending .
•	 Collateral haircuts limit the exposure of the central 
bank’s balance sheet to credit, market and liquid-
ity risk, and have potential policy implications 
because of their influence on financial market 
participants and on the relative liquidity of financial 
assets .
•	 Central banks must consider how their haircut 
policies affect the market’s asset allocation, the 
relative price and liquidity of assets, and the likeli-
hood of participants to default .
•	 Under extraordinary circumstances, there is a 
rationale for the central bank to temporarily reduce 
haircuts or broaden the list of eligible collateral to 
mitigate the shortage of liquidity in the market .
T
o maintain monetary and financial stability, 
central banks may need to provide liquidity to 
financial institutions, financial markets and 
financial market infrastructure.
1 This includes the 
extension of intraday and overnight loans to promote 
a safe and efficient payments system. When 
extending these loans, the central bank typically 
requires collateral (assets pledged as security) to 
protect its balance sheet against the risk of default 
by the borrower (credit risk).
2 In addition, the central 
bank also applies a discount (haircut) to the market 
value of the instruments pledged, as protection 
against a decline in the value of the collateral (market 
risk) and a decline in the asset’s marketability 
(liquidity risk).
3 Given the pivotal role of the central 
bank in the financial system, the design of its collat-
eral policy is important. In particular, what should the 
size of haircuts be and how should that size vary 
under different financial system conditions?
Haircuts are typically chosen  
to protect lenders in the event of  
a borrower’s default
This article examines how haircuts on collateral 
pledged to the central bank are determined. Haircuts 
are typically chosen to protect lenders against 
market and liquidity risk in the event of a borrower’s 
1  Financial market infrastructure includes exchanges, central counter-
parties, and payment and settlement systems. Under the Payment 
Clearing and Settlement Act, the Bank of Canada is responsible for the 
regulatory oversight of clearing and settlement systems with a view to 
controlling systemic risk.
2  A list of eligible securities and margin requirements for the Bank of 
Canada’s Standing Liquidity Facility as of 7 September 2010 is available 
at <http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/ 
securities_160710.pdf>.
3  Note, however, that a central bank is better able to absorb liquidity risk 
than private agents, owing to its ability to create liquidity.
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bank should also consider the impact of its haircut 
policy on the risk-management incentives and asset-
portfolio decisions of its counterparties and on the 
relative market liquidity of securities.
4, 5 These 
effects arise from the central bank’s unique ability to 
create liquid settlement assets and because it is a 
major participant in the financial system, owing to 
the size of its balance sheet and the fact that it can 
undertake much larger market interventions than 
private sector institutions.
The article begins with a discussion of the central 
bank’s role in providing liquidity in payments sys-
tems, as well as the role of collateral and haircuts in 
central bank lending. Particular institutional details 
are provided for the Canadian context. The next 
section focuses on the distinguishing features of a 
central bank’s haircut policy relative to private sector 
practices. This is followed by a review of recent 
research on the determination of the optimal level of 
haircuts, using a model that explicitly incorporates 
the central bank’s unique position in the payments 
system. The article concludes with an examination of 
the implications of this research for central bank 
haircut policy.
Liquidity Provision in Payments 
Systems
Financial institutions send payments to each other 
continuously throughout the day on their own behalf 
and on behalf of their clients. These payment flows 
arise from the underlying economic activities of 
payments-system participants and their clients. 
Although particular arrangements and institutional 
details differ from country to country and from 
system to system, central banks generally play an 
important role in the provision of liquidity to these 
payments systems and in their oversight. Central 
banks typically require collateral and face a funda-
mental trade-off between risk and liquidity when 
setting their haircut policies.
The Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) is the main 
settlement system in Canada. It is used to complete 
large-value, time-critical payments arising from the 
4  The idea that collateral policy can play an important role in influencing 
the development of financial markets has been known for some time. 
It has influenced Bank of Canada actions to promote the development 
of Canadian financial markets since the 1950s and has underpinned 
technical advice provided by the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank, among others, for many years.
5  Market liquidity refers to the ability to quickly sell an asset without caus-
ing a significant movement in its price.
day-to-day business activities of households, cor-
porations and financial institutions, and to settle 
Canadian-dollar obligations arising from securities 
and foreign exchange transactions.
6 
The Bank of Canada plays a central role in the day-
to-day operation and oversight of the LVTS. 
Participants in the system use claims on the Bank 
(reserve accounts at the Bank of Canada) to settle 
their net payment obligations with other direct par-
ticipants. The Bank also supplies liquidity to the 
system via collateralized intraday and overnight 
loans to LVTS participants (see Box). The Bank is 
also responsible for overseeing the operation and 
risk controls of the LVTS, given the LVTS’s designa-
tion as a systemically important system.
Intraday finality and the Bank of Canada’s 
residual guarantee
The LVTS processes payments in real time, and 
settlement of the system occurs on a multilateral net 
basis at the end of the day. During the day, pro-
cessed payments are final and irrevocable. This 
immediate intraday finality is achieved because the 
Bank of Canada explicitly guarantees that settlement 
will occur, even in the event of multiple defaults.
7 
This is facilitated through the use of collateral to 
secure participants’ intraday net debit (negative) 
positions and by a residual guarantee provided by 
the Bank.
The Bank of Canada explicitly  
guarantees that settlement will occur, 
even in the event of multiple defaults
Since payments are not fully funded by senders’ 
settlement balances or fully collateralized by the 
senders’ and/or recipients’ collateral holdings, this 
central bank guarantee of intraday finality provides 
an implicit intraday credit to system participants.
6  Arjani and McVanel (2006) provide an overview of the structure of the 
LVTS and its relationship to the Canadian financial system. The LVTS 
is owned and operated by the Canadian Payments Association and is 
overseen by the Bank of Canada. See also the information contained in 
the backgrounder on the LVTS at <http://www.bankofcanada.ca/about/
backgrounders/large-value-transfer-system-lvts/>.
7  If multiple participants default and if the collateral assigned to the 
system is insufficient to cover the total value of their obligations, the 
Bank of Canada would take possession of the available collateral and 
become an unsecured creditor of the defaulting institutions for the 
amount remaining after the collateral has been sold.
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The Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) is a real-
time, electronic wire transfer system that pro-
cesses large-value, time-critical payments quickly 
and continuously throughout the day. It assures 
participants and their customers that, once a 
payment message has passed the system’s risk-
control tests, the transaction is settled on the 
books of the Bank of Canada on the same day, 
regardless of what happens to any of the partici-
pants afterward. 
The sender of an LVTS payment can choose 
between two payment streams: Tranche 1 and 
Tranche 2. Each tranche has a corresponding 
risk-control limit. 
A participant can send a Tranche 1 payment as 
long as the net amount that it owes (the balance of 
all its Tranche 1 payments sent and received) is 
less than the collateral that it has pledged to the 
Bank of Canada for Tranche 1 activity. Should the 
participant default during the course of that day, 
this collateral would be used to cover any net 
negative position in this payment stream. For this 
reason, Tranche 1 payments are known as 
“defaulter-pays.” 
Under Tranche 2, each participating institution 
begins the day by granting a bilateral credit limit 
(BCL) (which can be zero) to every other partici-
pating institution—the largest net exposure that it 
is prepared to accept from another participant on 
that day. These BCLs limit the negative position 
that each participant can take vis-à-vis other 
participants. In addition, each participant (as a 
sender) has a multilateral net debit cap, calculated 
as the sum of all BCLs extended to it, multiplied 
by a specified system-wide percentage set by the 
Canadian Payments Association. This multilateral 
cap limits the exposure of each participant in 
relation to the whole system and therefore the 
potential magnitude of any default. Each partici-
pating financial institution pledges collateral to the 
Bank of Canada in an amount equal to the largest 
BCL that it has extended to any other institution, 
multiplied by the specified system-wide per-
centage. If a participating institution fails, its col-
lateral is seized and used to meet its obligation. If 
the defaulter’s collateral is insufficient, the loss-
allocation procedures distribute any remaining 
obligation proportionally among survivors on the 
basis of the BCLs granted by survivors to the 
failed institution. The survivors’ obligation is not 
unlimited: it will never be larger than the amount 
of collateral they have pledged to the Bank. The 
collateral pledged by system participants is always 
sufficient to cover the failure of the institution with 
the largest possible amount owing to the system, 
i.e., the institution with the largest net debit cap. 
Tranche 2 has been described as “survivors-pay,” 
since surviving financial institutions may be called 
upon to absorb the losses associated with a 
failure (after the defaulter’s collateral is seized and 
used to meet its obligations). In the event of mul-
tiple defaults, the same process is used: first the 
defaulters’ collateral is used, then the survivors 
face a loss allocation. If an obligation remains, the 
Bank will contribute the funds to settle the system 
under its residual guarantee. 
Tranche 2 payments make up the great majority of 
the volume and value of payment transfers in the 
LVTS, principally because of savings in collateral 
relative to Tranche 1 operations. Nevertheless, 
participants who want immediate real-time settle-
ment equivalency prefer Tranche 1 payments, 
even though they come with higher collateral 
costs.
Collateral Requirements Under Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 
of the LVTSThe Standing Liquidity Facility
The Bank also facilitates settlement of the LVTS by 
routinely extending overnight collateralized loans 
through the Standing Liquidity Facility (SLF) to direct 
LVTS participants that are experiencing temporary 
shortfalls in their settlement balances at the end of 
the day. These advances provide participants with 
access to a reliable source of liquidity should they 
need to fund their end-of-day payment obligations, 
thus helping them to transfer payments efficiently 
among themselves during the day.
8 The interest rate 
on the overnight loan is set at the upper limit of the 
Bank of Canada’s operating band for the overnight 
interest rate (the Bank Rate).
9
Collateral services
The Bank establishes eligibility criteria for the various 
asset types that can be pledged intraday to collat-
eralize bilateral credit limits or overnight through the 
SLF. It provides the LVTS system operator, the 
Canadian Payments Association, with valuations of 
the securities that are pledged as collateral. The 
Bank values and monitors the collateral pledged by 
LVTS participants on an ongoing basis.
The Role of Collateral and 
Haircuts in Central Bank Lending
Why lend against collateral?
Lenders require the pledging of assets to secure a 
loan, primarily to protect themselves against the risk 
of default by the borrower. As a public institution, a 
central bank requires collateral to protect its balance 
sheet against such risk.
10 
While small financial losses would likely have minor 
consequences, the negative effect of a significant 
loss on the central bank’s balance sheet could pot-
entially affect its ability to achieve its monetary policy 
and financial stability objectives. It could also under-
mine public confidence in the central bank. Any 
central bank financial loss from defaulted loans will 
8  For more information on the function of the Bank of Canada as “lender 
of last resort,” see <http://www.bankofcanada.ca/financial-system/
lender-of-last-resort/>.
9  This provides LVTS participants with a pricing incentive to first look for 
other sources of funding. For further details, see the backgrounder on 
the Bank Rate at <http://www.bankofcanada.ca/about/backgrounders/
bank-rate/>. For more information on the implementation of monetary 
policy in the LVTS environment, see the Bank’s primer at <http://www.
bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/lvts_primer_2010.pdf>.
10 The Bank of Canada Act (<http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/
uploads/2010/07/act_loi_boc_bdc.pdf>) requires the Bank to take col-
lateral when making loans or providing advances.
have a negative impact on the balance sheet of 
either the central bank or the government.
11 While 
the exact timing of the loss can be altered by short-
term portfolio and debt management (e.g., central 
bank sterilization or public debt issuance), the loss 
must ultimately be absorbed by some form of costly 
taxation or asset sales and would therefore affect 
the financial health of the consolidated balance 
sheet of the government and the central bank and, 
accordingly, the economy.
12
A significant loss on the central bank’s 
balance sheet could potentially affect 
its ability to achieve its monetary policy 
and financial stability objectives
The central bank also requires collateral to support 
neutrality in the conduct of liquidity operations and 
to avoid having to differentiate the pricing of its 
lending in day-to-day operations based on the 
creditworthiness of the counterparties. Secured 
lending allows the central bank to lend at a single 
interest rate to a set of heterogeneous counter-
parties, which facilitates the communication and 
transmission of monetary policy.
13
What is a haircut?
The amount of collateral required for a loan is deter-
mined by the haircut applied by the lender. The 
haircut “trims” the market value of the collateral by a 
certain percentage to determine the maximum loan 
amount. For example, when the haircut is 1 per cent, 
the borrower needs to post collateral (e.g., treasury 
bills) with a value of $100 with the central bank in 
order to acquire a loan of $99.
11 The central bank can finance the loss by permanently expanding the 
monetary base (i.e., a seigniorage tax), limiting the flexibility needed to 
achieve price and financial stability. Alternatively, by decreasing remit-
tances of earnings (or through capital injections from the government), 
the loss can be transferred to the government. The government would 
have to finance the loss by raising taxes or by cutting spending, hence, 
tightening its budget and potentially lowering economic welfare.
12 Johnson and Zelmer (2007) examine, in the context of central bank 
balance-sheet management under new accounting standards, how a 
negative capital position on the Bank’s balance sheet might pose risks 
to the credibility of monetary policy and raise doubts about its ability to 
act as lender of last resort.
13 There are strict “membership criteria” for becoming a direct counter-
party to the Bank of Canada, either as a direct LVTS participant or as a 
primary dealer.
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In the event that a borrower defaults, a haircut mini-
mizes the lender’s losses from the market and 
liquidity risks associated with the collateral pledged. 
A lender’s key concerns are what the secondary 
price of the collateral would be when the lender 
needs to sell the collateral to reclaim the funds 
loaned and how long it would take to liquidate it. 
A haircut is therefore determined based on the price 
volatility and liquidity of the pledged collateral asset. 
More-volatile or less-liquid assets usually receive a 
higher haircut to protect the lender from a price 
decline or liquidation costs. In the case of a default 
where the price of the collateral drops so low that the 
haircut provides insufficient coverage, the lender will 
suffer a loss. Thus, when determining the size of a 
haircut, there is a trade-off: a lower haircut can 
relax the borrower’s liquidity constraint, but it also 
increases the lender’s potential loss.
A haircut also influences the behaviour of potential 
counterparties. A borrower facing a haircut is less 
inclined to default because the collateral posted with 
the lender is worth more than the loan amount it has 
received. Hence, the borrower is more likely to repay 
the loan and retrieve the collateral.
Central Bank vs. Private Sector 
Haircuts
The traditional risk-management approach used to 
determine haircuts is based on examining the histor-
ical volatility of the value of the collateral and setting 
a haircut to limit the lender’s risk exposure, based on 
a given risk tolerance.
14 This approach is appropriate 
for a private sector lender that has little market 
power and wants to maximize expected return and 
minimize exposure to counterparty default.
The central bank’s unique ability to create and 
supply an unlimited amount of settlement assets to 
the payments system ensures that it is never con-
strained in its provision of liquidity.
15 Nevertheless, 
any losses incurred will be shared by society and 
will likely generate costly economic distortions. 
The central bank must therefore balance access to 
liquidity with prudent risk management.
14 See, for example, García and Gençay (2006) and the related risk- 
management literature cited.
15 Payments in the LVTS are settled via the account balances that partici-
pants hold at the Bank. Since the Bank of Canada can supply virtually 
unlimited amounts of these deposits and guarantees settlement even in 
the event of multiple defaults on a single day, sufficient balances will be 
available for settlement purposes under all circumstances.
The central bank also plays a prominent role in the 
overnight money market and other core funding 
markets. The study presented in the following sec-
tion argues that the central bank’s haircut policy can 
therefore directly affect liquidity in these markets and 
indirectly influence market participants’ choice of 
asset portfolios, as well as the pricing of credit and 
liquidity spreads. The central bank is concerned not 
only about its own exposure to credit risk, but also 
about the efficiency and stability of the financial 
system. Consequently, in setting its haircut policy, 
the central bank must consider the impact of the 
policy on the financial system and its participants.
16
The central bank is concerned not only 
about its own exposure to credit risk, 
but also about the efficiency and  
stability of the financial system
A Model of Central Bank Haircuts
In a recent study, Chapman, Chiu and Molico (2011) 
develop a stylized model of the Canadian large-value 
payments system to examine the various effects that 
changes to central bank collateral haircuts can have 
on the economy.
The model economy
In the model, financial institutions (FIs) send and 
receive payments through a payments system on 
behalf of their clients. FIs are uncertain of the exact 
amount and timing of these payments and must 
therefore efficiently manage their liquidity based on a 
forecast of their payment needs. At the beginning of 
each day, FIs try to forecast their liquidity needs and 
to optimize their asset portfolios accordingly by 
trading with each other in a financial market. In the 
model, an FI can hold only two possible assets in its 
portfolio: a liquid asset, which has a lower rate of 
return but is (or can be easily exchanged for) the 
means of settling payment obligations; and an illiquid 
asset, which has a higher expected rate of return but 
is not generally accepted in the settlement of pay-
ment obligations, and has a more volatile price (is 
16 As discussed in Zorn and García (2011), the collateral policy of central 
banks not only reflects the objective of protecting the central bank’s 
balance sheet from financial losses arising from a counterparty default, 
but also supports the central bank’s objectives for monetary policy 
and financial stability, including encouraging better risk-management 
practices by financial institutions.
17 
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between liquidity risk and asset return. When FIs 
foresee the need to send a high volume of payments, 
they will choose to hold a higher amount of the liquid 
asset than the illiquid asset to facilitate payment. If 
they expect to receive more payments than they 
send, they will choose to hold a lower amount of the 
liquid asset to earn a higher rate of return. Given the 
uncertain nature of the payment flows, however, and 
their realized payment needs, some banks may be 
holding too little of the liquid asset.
If FIs are unable to fund a shortage of the liquid 
asset through the intraday money market, then the 
central bank lending facility comes into play. In the 
study, the authors focus on this specific case. In this 
situation, there is credit risk because central bank 
loans are subject to potential default by the bor-
rowers. To limit its financial exposure, the central 
bank requires borrowers to pledge their asset hold-
ings as collateral. In the model, since the only FIs 
that require central bank funding are those that need 
to send payments but hold illiquid assets, these are 
the assets pledged as collateral. Since the market 
price of these illiquid assets can fluctuate, the central 
bank applies a haircut to their value when deter-
mining the amount of the loan. This protects its bal-
ance sheet in case there is a default by the borrower 
that is accompanied by a decrease in the price of the 
pledged asset. If there is no default, the borrower 
repays the loan and retrieves its collateral. If there is 
a default, the collateral is surrendered to the central 
bank, which will sell it to recover its losses.
The authors analyze the effects of central bank hair-
cuts on several key aspects of the financial system: 
the amount of liquidity in the system, equilibrium 
asset prices, the exposure of the central bank’s 
balance sheet, the asset-portfolio decisions of finan-
cial institutions and their incentives to default.
The following three channels interact and jointly 
determine the equilibrium effects of the haircut policy 
on the economy:
(i) Payments-system liquidity
Changes in the central bank’s haircut policy affect 
the borrowing constraint faced by payments-system 
participants that need funding. They directly alter the 
borrowing and payment decisions of the affected FIs 
and, ultimately, improve or restrict underlying con-
sumption and production in the economy. By 
lowering the haircut, the central bank reduces the 
discount on collateral and relaxes the liquidity con-
straint of FIs that are holding the illiquid asset but 
need liquidity. This facilitates payment flows and 
supports economic activity.
(ii)  Asset allocation
Changes to the haircut on a specific asset will affect 
its relative liquidity with respect to other assets. In 
the model, a lower haircut on the illiquid asset allows 
its holder relatively easier access to liquidity if 
needed.
17 This, in turn, affects the portfolio deci-
sions of FIs when they forecast their liquidity needs 
and, ultimately, affects the prices and allocation of 
financial assets. A lower haircut will increase the 
attractiveness of the illiquid asset, which alters the 
relative prices of the liquid and illiquid assets and 
induces agents to accumulate more of the illiquid 
asset. This change in portfolio can be welfare 
reducing, if the initial holding of liquid and illiquid 
assets is optimal, or it can be welfare enhancing, if 
the initial portfolio is not socially optimal and agents 
are holding too much of the liquid asset.
(iii) Central bank exposure
For a given probability of default by the borrowers, 
lowering the haircut on a risky asset could increase 
the exposure of the central bank’s balance sheet to 
possible losses. In addition, a lower haircut could 
potentially increase the probability of default 
because it makes the decision to default less costly 
relative to repaying the loan. Haircuts set too low 
could therefore give FIs the incentive to default. This 
increased probability of default affects the central 
bank’s ability to control price stability because of a 
potential unintended expansion of its balance sheet. 
In the model, this translates into an expansion of the 
monetary base that can increase expected inflation, 
which is costly to society.
18 
Discussion and Conclusion
While the model presented here is stylized, it high-
lights the essential points that the central bank must 
consider when determining its haircut policy. First, it 
stresses the traditional trade-off between the provi-
sion of liquidity and the credit, market and liquidity 
risks. When providing liquidity via collateralized 
loans, the central bank must consider the implica-
tions of restricting the eligibility of assets, as well as 
the impact of its haircut policy on the exposure of its 
17 Since the model deals with only two assets, this change in relative 
liquidity is between these two assets. In the more realistic case, a 
change in the haircut on one asset will change its liquidity in relation to 
that of all other assets.
18 Since the government’s fiscal authority is not explicitly modelled, the 
loss is financed by an inflation tax.
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highlights the potential of the central bank’s haircut 
policy to affect the allocations of asset portfolios, 
asset prices and borrowers’ incentives to default, 
which, as noted above, can have real welfare 
consequences.
19
The model highlights the potential of 
the central bank’s haircut policy to 
affect the allocations of asset port-
folios, asset prices and borrowers’ 
incentives to default
In its day-to-day operations, under normal circum-
stances, the central bank typically restricts the list of 
eligible assets accepted in payments systems to 
high-quality assets with relatively low credit and 
liquidity risk; it aims for “market-neutrality,” whereby 
its operations do not significantly influence relative 
asset prices.
20 Under extraordinary circumstances, 
such as a liquidity-induced crisis, however, it may 
be reasonable for the central bank to temporarily 
broaden the collateral pool and accept less-
marketable assets in its day-to-day operations,
 thus 
freeing more conventional liquid collateral for use in 
other operations.
21 When the scarcity of liquidity 
threatens the well-functioning of the financial system 
(for example, during a period of financial stress), the 
benefits of providing additional central bank liquidity 
by reducing haircuts or expanding the list of eligible 
assets can outweigh the potential costs associated 
with the distortion of asset portfolios and the higher 
risk exposure of the central bank’s balance sheet. 
A similar view—that central banks should take the 
liquidity of the financial system into account when 
setting haircuts—is found in the report of the  
 
19 For a discussion on the collateral-management practices of LVTS par-
ticipants during relatively normal times, see D’Souza (2009).
20 Chailloux, Gray and McCaughrin (2008) provide a comparison of col-
lateral frameworks in different jurisdictions. They discuss the eligibility 
of assets as collateral and the implications of collateral policy for the 
market’s choice of asset portfolios and for the pricing of credit and 
liquidity spreads.
21 During the recent financial crisis, the Bank of Canada expanded the 
list of assets that could be pledged as collateral in LVTS intraday 
operations and under the SLF, while strengthening its requirements for 
transparency and credit ratings. Direct participants in the LVTS were 
able to pledge their non-mortgage loan portfolio (NMLP) to cover the 
system’s collateral requirements, as well as those of the SLF and the 
Term Loan Facility. As of 1 April 2010, LVTS participants may use their 
NMLP for up to 20 per cent of their total collateral value. The Bank also 
conducted term purchase and resale agreements with primary dealers 
against an expanded set of eligible securities.
Bank for International Settlements’ Committee on 
the Global Financial System (CGFS 2010) on the 
cyclical behaviour of private sector margins and 
haircuts.
Policy-makers face the challenge  
of a growing demand for high- 
quality collateral
Policy-makers also face the challenge of a growing 
demand for high-quality collateral. Modern financial 
systems tend to utilize more collateral because of the 
increased private use of collateral, and because of 
the need to post additional collateral with payment 
and settlement systems.
22 The G-20 countries  
committed to have all standardized over-the-counter 
derivatives contracts cleared by central counter-
parties (CCPs) by the end of 2012 to help strengthen 
the global financial system. Such an increase in 
CCP activity has the potential to increase the need 
for collateral.
23 In addition, revisions to the core 
principles for financial market infrastructure, cur-
rently being considered by the Bank for International 
Settlements’ Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems and by the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions, will further increase the 
demand for collateral by financial market participants. 
The haircuts set by central banks are important 
parameters in determining the ability of financial 
systems to make the most efficient use of high-
quality collateral.
22 An example of the increased private use of collateral is the larger size 
of institutional cash pools, which demand collateral in their day-to-day 
money market investments (Pozsar 2011).
23 If the settlement of over-the-counter financial transactions moves to 
CCPs, then the aggregate value of collateral needed may decrease 
because of efficiency gains in multilateral netting. But if this move de-
creases the overall amount of netting, then the need for collateral could 
increase (Duffie and Zhu 2010).
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